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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an individual 
by and through her guardians, 
SHERRIE JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, 
and DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Const., art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(g) 
and (j) (Supp. 1992). The Third Judicial District Court denied 
defendants/ motions for summary judgment on March 30, 1992 and 
defendants' joint petition for permission to appeal the inter-
locutory order was granted by this Court on June 23, 1992. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the Amended Utah 
Governmental Iinmunity Act does not validly limit the liability of 
the University Hospital to $250,000? This is a legal determination 
for which the Court gives no deference, but rather reviews for 
correctness. Standard Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 
P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1991). 
Supreme Court No. 920218 
Priority No. 11 
1 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Utah Const., art. I, §§7, 11, and 24. 
2. Utah Const., art V, § 1. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2(3),(4), and (9) (1989). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1966 and 1978). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a legal malpractice action against defen-
dants Roger Sharp and Tim Healy, plaintiffs/ former attorneys. 
Plaintiffs retained Sharp and Healy to pursue a medical malpractice 
claim against the University Medical Center, which includes the 
University Hospital and the College of Medicine. Sharp and Healy 
subsequently negotiated a $250,000 settlement on plaintiffs' 
behalf. Plaintiffs later filed this action against defendants 
Sharp and Healy alleging that the amount of the settlement 
negotiated by defendants was inadequate. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the 
$250,000 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law because the 
alleged negligent act was performed by an agent of the College of 
Medicine and, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA), the 
liability of the College of Medicine is limited to $250,000. 
Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum did not dispute the fact that the 
College of Medicine's liability is limited to $250,000. Instead, 
plaintiffs asserted that the University Hospital was also 
negligent, and that the liability limit of $250,000 was declared to 
2 
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be unconstitutional by this court in Condemarin v. University 
Hospital insofar as it pertained to the University Hospital. 
Defendants responded to plaintiffs/ opposing memorandum by 
asserting that, even if the University Hospital were negligent, its 
liability is also limited to $250,000 because of a subsequent 
amendment to the UGIA. Defendants also suggested that inadequate 
briefing by the parties in Condemarin may have led to an improper 
result in that case. Because plaintiffs chose not to contest the 
liability limit of the College of Medicine, the central issue in 
this motion became whether the liability of the University Hospital 
is limited to $250,000. Defendants allowed plaintiffs to submit a 
supplemental memorandum in order to fully address this primary 
issue. 
Although the trial court denied defendants7 motions, the court 
nonetheless recognized that "the issue in dispute is pivotal and 
dispositive." The trial court further "urge[d] defendants to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their motions." 
(R. 725). Defendants then petitioned for and received permission 
to appeal the trial courts interlocutory order. 
STATEMENTS OF FACT 
1. In January of 1989, plaintiff Shelly Hipwell was injured 
as a result of alleged negligent treatment at the University 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 5). 
2. Plaintiffs Sherrie Jensen and Shayne Hipwell were duly 
appointed to be the co-guardians of plaintiff Shelly Hipwell. 
3 
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(R. 3). 
3. Shelly Hipwell's guardians retained defendants Roger Sharp 
and Tim Healy to pursue Shelley's claims against the University 
Hospital and Medical Center. (R. 6-7). 
4. Defendants Sharp and Healy negotiated a $250,000 
settlement which was paid by the State of Utah to Shelly Hipwell 
and her co-guardians (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"plaintiffs"). (R. 8). 
5. Plaintiffs have subsequently filed suit against defendants 
Sharp and Healy claiming that the $250,000 settlement was 
inadequate. (R. 9-10). 
6. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
plaintiffs7 $250,000 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law 
because the liability of the University Hospital is limited to 
$250,000 under the 1987 version of the UGIA. (R. 163, 165, 541). 
7. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary 
judgment, concluding that the 1987 Act is unconstitutional "for the 
reasons specified in plaintiffs' memoranda. . . . " No other 
explanation was given. (R. 725). 
8. Defendants have subsequently received permission from this 
Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 730). 
9. On May 27, 1992, while defendants' petition for 
interlocutory appeal was pending, plaintiff Shelly Hipwell passed 
away. (R. 728). 
4 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The $250,000 settlement negotiated by defendants on 
plaintiffs' behalf is reasonable as a matter of law because the 
liability of the University Hospital is limited to $250,000 under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). 
Plaintiffs contest this fact by asserting that the liability 
limit contained in the UGIA is unconstitutional insofar as it 
pertains to the University Hospital. In support of this claim, 
plaintiffs cite to this Court's decision in Condemarin v. 
University Hospital. However, Condemarin does not affect the 
outcome of this case for two reasons. 
First, the Condemarin opinion was premised upon an erroneous 
assumption that, under the common law, state hospitals were capable 
of performing "proprietary functions" and were subject to suit for 
torts arising out of those functions. This led the Condemarin 
plurality to believe that the 1978 UGIA purported to extend 
immunity to the University Hospital as a "non-governmental 
function" rather than as a "governmental function." These 
incorrect assumptions ultimately led to the incorrect conclusion 
that the 1978 UGIA unconstitutionally limited the liability of the 
University Hospital. Because of these errors, Condemarin should be 
overruled and the liability cap reinstated. 
Second, even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are still 
entitled to summary judgment because the 1987 amendment to the UGIA 
remedied any constitutional defect that may have existed in the 
5 
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Act. As it now stands, the 1987 UGIA is constitutional in every 
respect and validly limits the liability of the University Hospital 
to $250,000. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE AMENDED UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
LEGALLY LIMITS THE LIABILITY OP THE UNIVERSITY 
HOSPITAL TO $250,000. THUS, PLAINTIFFS' 
$250,000 SETTLEMENT IS REASONABLE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that defendants were negligent 
in settling plaintiffs' case for $250,000. Plaintiffs argue that, 
while the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) limited the 
liability of the University Hospital in the past, such limited 
liability was found to be unconstitutional by this Court in 
Condemarin v. University Hosp.. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). In 
contrast, defendants assert that Condemarin was decided in error 
and that in any event the liability limit has been reinstated by 
subsequent amendment of the UGIA. Defendants further assert that 
the liability limit in the amended Act is constitutional. 
A. HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN UTAH. 
A correct understanding of the development of governmental 
immunity in Utah is crucial to the outcome of this case. For this 
reason, the history of governmental immunity is set out below, 
beginning with the status of governmental immunity at the time the 
Utah Constitution was adopted. 
6 
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1. At common law all state entities were absolutely immune 
from suit# absent consent to the contrary. 
Municipalities, on the other hand, were only granted 
immunity for "governmental functions". 
When the Utah Constitution was ratified, and continuing 
thereafter, the common law provided that the state was absolutely 
immune from suit, absent its statutory consent to the contrary: 
In the absence of either express constitutional 
or statutory authority an action against a 
sovereign state cannot be maintained. The 
doctrine is elementary and of universal 
application and so far as we are aware there is 
not a single authority to the contrary, 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 492-93, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913) 
(emphasis added). 
This immunity extended to all subdivisions of the state: 
If the result of the action is to appropriate 
the state7s funds to satisfy the judgment 
rendered in the action, the action is against 
the state, regardless of its form or against 
whom brought. 
Id. at 630, 42 Utah at 493. 
Apparently, all common law governmental immunity cases in Utah 
have similarly recognized that state entities are absolutely immune 
from suit, absent consent to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. 
District Court, Fourth Judic. Dist. . 94 Utah 384, 389, 78 P.2d 502, 
504 (1937) ("The state cannot be sued unless it has given its 
consent or has waived its immunity."); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State 
Road Coram'n, 95 Utah 242, 249, 70 P.2d 857, 861 (1937) ("Action may 
not be maintained [against the state] unless the state has, through 
legislative or constitutional action, given consent to be sued."); 
7 
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Bingham v. Board of Educ. , 118 Utah 582, 592, 223 P.2d 432, 438 
(1950) ("Under our constitution, the power to make departments of 
the state respond in damages for torts rests with the legislature, 
and without legislative enactment we are unable to impose any 
liability. . . . " ) . 
Standing in sharp contrast to the absolute immunity of the 
state is the partial immunity afforded to municipalities. 
Municipalities are not afforded absolute immunity under the common 
law because they are a hybrid of the state and a private corpora-
tion. On the one hand, municipalities act as agents of the state 
and perform many types of public or governmental functions. On the 
other hand, a municipality is a private corporation capable of 
acting in a private capacity. In order to account for this dual 
nature, the common law provides that a municipality can share in 
the state's immunity only when it is acting as an agent of the 
state and is thereby performing a public or "governmental 
function." However, municipalities are not allowed to share in the 
state's immunity when they are acting in their private capacities, 
or rather are performing "proprietary functions:" 
It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction 
that a municipal corporation may act both in a 
public and a private capacity and that when 
performing in a public or governmental function 
it is not subject to tort liability. 
Ramirez v. Qgden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 104, 279 P.2d 463, 464 (1955) 
(emphasis added). 
In accordance with these principles, all common law govern-
8 
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mental immunity cases involving municipalities have applied the 
"governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction, which 
distinction is not made in the cases involving state entities. 
These cases are very careful to limit the application of the 
"governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction to 
municipal entities: 
The law in respect to the liability of municipal 
corporations in discharging governmental or 
public duties is well and tersely stated . . . 
in the following language: 'The rule is general 
that a municipal corporation is not liable for 
alleged tortious injuries to the persons or 
property of individuals, when engaged in the 
performance of public or governmental functions 
or duties. So far as municipal corporations 
exercise powers conferred on them for purposes 
essentially public, they stand as does 
sovereignty whose agents they are, and are not 
liable to be sued for any act or omission 
occurring while in the exercise of such powers, 
unless by some statute the right of action be 
given.' 
Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 184, 89 P. 714, 715 (1907) 
(emphasis added). See also Ramirez v. Qgden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 
104-105, 279 P.2d 463, 464 (1955); Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 
Utah 573, 575, 111 P.2d 800, 801 (1941); Rollow v. Qgden City, 66 
Utah 475, 481, 243 P. 791, 793 (1926); Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 
Utah 568, 569-70, 231 P. 1102, 1102-1103 (1924); Sehv v. Salt Lake 
City, 41 Utah 535, 537, 126 P. 691 (1912). 
As evidenced by the differing lines of cases involving state 
and municipal entities, the "governmental function"/"proprietary 
function" distinction applies only to municipalities at common law. 
The distinction has never applied to state entities, which have 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
always been absolutely immune from suit. By definition, the state 
is the government and thus any action it performs is a "govern-
mental function." See Bingham v. Board of Educ. , 118 Utah 582, 
587, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (1950) (the duties of state agencies are 
"wholly governmental"); State v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. 
1985) (the activities of a state entity are "exclusively govern-
mental functions. . . . " ) . 
Numerous cases and articles have recognized the differing 
treatment that is given to states and municipalities at common law, 
including the Utah Law Review: 
The Utah Supreme Court, early in its history 
declared the immunity rule to be an elememtary 
and universal principle and held that an ctction 
against a sovereign state cannot be maintained 
in the absence of express constitutional or 
statutory authority. The doctrine cannot be 
circumvented by suing a state agency; the test 
is that where a judgment would have to be 
satisfied from state funds, there is in essence 
an action against the state. 
* * * 
Municipal corporations do not fully partake of 
the state7s immunity because of their peculiar 
nature. They are on the one hand subdivisions 
of the state exercising governmental powers, yet 
on the other hand they engage in activities 
similar to those of private corporations. 
Because of this dual character, the immunity of 
the state is extended to the municipality only 
when it acts in a governmental capacity. Where 
the municipal corporation acts in a private or 
corporate capacity, it is liable for its torts. 
This rule of law seems to be uniform throughout 
the country. . . . 
Note, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah, 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 
234 & 236-37 (1956) (emphasis added). 
10 
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This Court has similarly recognized the differing treatment 
that was given to state entities and municipalities at common law, 
as illustrated in Bingham v. Board of Educ. . 118 Utah 582, 223 P. 2d 
432 (1950). 
The plaintiff in Bingham was suing the Board of Education for 
negligence and for nuisance. The Board of Education claimed that 
it was absolutely immune from suit as an agent of the state. The 
plaintiff asserted that the Board of Education was merely a 
municipality and was thus subject to suit for torts it committed 
during the performance of a "proprietary function." Thus, the 
issue faced by the Court was whether the Board of Education was a 
state entity or a municipality. This issue arose because, on the 
one hand, the Board of Education had an independent existence as a 
Utah corporation similar to a municipality, while on the other 
hand, the board was founded, supervised, and controlled directly by 
the state as are other state agencies. 
This Court ultimately concluded that the Board of Education 
was more like a state agency than a municipality. The Court 
referred to the board as a "quasi-municipal corporation" rather 
than as an ordinary municipal corporation. The Court then 
described in great detail the differing treatment that was given to 
municipal corporations and "quasi-municipal corporations" (i.e. 
state agencies) at common law: 
The authorities seem to make a distinction 
between municipal corporations and what are 
termed "quasi-municipal" corporations. This 
distinction is better understood when consider-
11 
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ation is given to the fact that school boards 
are created exclusively for school purposes and 
are mere agencies of the state . . . and that, 
as to tort liability, such agencies or authori-
ties occupy a status different from that of 
municipal corporations which ordinarily have a 
dual character and which may exercise propri-
etary as well as governmental functions. 
It is pertinent to state here that there is a 
distinction between municipal corporations 
proper and quasi-municipal corporations 
concerning liability for torts, and that the 
general rule is that the latter is not liable 
for torts unless allowed bv statute. 
[Quasi-municipal corporations1 are usually 
treated as public or state agencies, and their 
duties are ordinarily wholly governmental. They 
exercise the greater part of their functions as 
agencies of the state. . . . On the other hand, 
it is recognized that the municipal corporation 
proper has functions which are performed by it 
not as a mere agent of the state, but in its 
capacity as a corporation serving alone* the 
local inhabitants. If the city should be 
regarded as a state agency at all times, . . . 
there would exist no logical ground for holding 
it liable for damages due to negligence, since 
in no instance is a state held liable under the 
general principles of law. 
Id. at 435, 118 Utah at 587-88 (emphasis added, citations and 
quotations omitted). 
After concluding that the Board of Education was a state 
entity, the Court extended absolute immunity to the board, rather 
than the partial immunity that is afforded municipalities. 
An additional example is found in Hale v. Port of Portland, 
783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989). The Plaintiff in Hale had filed a 
personal injury action against both the Port of Portland (a state 
entity) and the County of Multnomah (a municipality) . When the 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court limited the defendant's damages to $100,000 pursuant to 
a statutory liability cap, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that 
the cap violated the "open-courts" provision of the state constitu-
tion. Both defendants argued that the "open-courts" provision was 
not violated because, at the time the "open-courts" provision was 
adopted, government entities were absolutely immune from suit under 
the common law. 
In deciding the controversy, the Oregon Supreme Court pointed 
out that the common law differed with respect to state entities and 
municipalities. While state entities were granted absolute 
immunity at common law, municipalities were only immune for 
"governmental functions." The court thus held that limiting the 
liability of the Port (a state entity) did not conflict with the 
"open-courts" provision of the state constitution: 
Unlike cities, but like other port districts, 
the Port is an instrumentality of the state 
government, performing state functions. 
* * * 
The Port, being a part of the state's govern-
ment, therefore is immune from suit to the same 
extent the state as such is immune. It follows 
that, contrary to the contention of plaintiff 
here, [the liability cap] does not deny 
plaintiff any right he has against the Port by 
virtue of the ["open-courts"] guaranty in Oregon 
Constitution Article I, Section 10, because 
there never was such a right. 
Id. at 511-12. 
After upholding the cap with regard to the state entity, the 
court addressed the validity of the statute with regard to the 
13 
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municipality. In doing so the court found that municipalities, 
unlike state entities, were not absolutely immune from suit at 
common law. Rather, :*t common 1^ . municipalities were immune for 
"governmental functions," but not for "proprietary functions": 
At common law, the state's immunity from suit 
extended to municipal corporations only when 
they were engaged in so-called "governmental" 
functions. Immunity did not extend to torts 
municipal corporations committed w;,ile 
performing "proprietary" ~*cts. . . . 
Id. at 512 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the statutory 
liability cap conflicted with the "open-courts" provision with 
regard to the municipality, but not with regard to the state. 
Numerous other courts have similarly held that the "govern-
mental function"/"proprietary function" distinction applies only to 
municipalities, and not to state entities which have always been 
absolutely immune from suit. See State v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 
186 (Mo. 1985) ("The traditional rule . . . permits the application 
of the governmental-proprietary distinction . . . only as to 
municipalities. Any other public entity . . . is in effect an arm 
of the state exercising exclusively governmental functions. . . 
. " ) ; State v. McHenrv. 687 S.W.2d 178, 181-82 (Mo. 1985) ("The 
proprietary-governmental dichotomy applies only in the law of 
municipal corporations, and not to activities of the state."); 
Green v. Commonwealth, 435 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Mass. App. 1982) ("The 
common law . . . did not recognize a proprietary-function exception 
to the general rule of sovereign immunity."); Prince George's 
14 
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County v. B lumber a. 407 A.2d 1151, 1177 (Md. App. 1979) ("In 
contrast to the situation with municipal agencies, the distinction 
between governmental and proprietary actions has no relevance with 
respect to the state or state agencies."); Crowe v. John W. Hartin 
Memorial Hosp., 579 S.W.3d 888, 890-91 (Tenn. App. 1979) (while a 
state entity is absolutely immune, municipalities can only share in 
the state's immunity when they are engaged in a "governmental 
function", as opposed to a "proprietary function"); Riddoch v. 
State. 123 P. 450, 452 (Wa. 1912) (The "governmental function"/ 
"proprietary function" distinction applies only to municipalities. 
The court knows of no precedent holding otherwise.). See also 
Prosser and Keaton, The Law of Torts, pp. 1043 & 1051 (5th Ed. 
1984) (at common law state entities were absolutely immune from 
suit while municipalities were only granted immunity for 
governmental activities, as opposed to proprietary ones); 
Restatement of Torts, Section 887, Comment c (1939) (Only the state 
has complete immunity from tort liability. Municipal corporations 
have immunity only for "governmental functions."). 
As the preceding authorities demonstrate, state entities have 
always been absolutely immune from suit under the common law. The 
"governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinction applied 
only to municipalities. The University Hospital, as an agent of 
the state, was therefore absolutely immune from suit at common law. 
Prior to the passage of the UGIA, individuals had no remedy against 
the University Hospital. 
15 
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2. In 1965 the State Gave i t s Limited Consent to be Sued by 
Adopting the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
In 1965 the s t a tu to ry consent needed t o sue the s t a t e (and 
munic ipa l i t i e s engaged in "governmental functions") was f i n a l l y 
given when the l e g i s l a t u r e adopted the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. This Act performs th ree t a s k s : 
1) F i r s t , the Act cod i f ies the absolute immunity 
t h a t was extended t o s t a t e e n t i t i e s and the p a r t i a l 
immunity t h a t was extended t o munic ipa l i t i e s a t 
common law,1 (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1965)); 
2) Second, the Act then waives the immunity granted 
under the preceding sec t ion for most s t a t e a c t i v i -
t i e s . (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-5 through 63-30-10.5 
(1965)); and 
3) Third, the Act then l i m i t s the l i a b i l i t y of the 
s t a t e for those a c t i v i t i e s where immunity was waived 
under the preceding sec t ion . Currently, the 
l i a b i l i t y cap i s s e t a t $250,000 for i n ju r i e s t o a 
s ing le person (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989)). 
The net r e s u l t of these th ree t a sks i s t h a t indiv iduals now 
have a remedy of up to $250,000 agains t s t a t e e n t i t i e s (and a lso 
agains t munic ipa l i t i e s performing "governmental functions") where 
no remedy previously ex i s ted . Incredib ly , p l a i n t i f f s are seeking 
to have the UGIA declared uncons t i t u t i ona l . If they succeed, the 
law of governmental immunity w i l l r e v e r t back t o the common law and 
p l a i n t i f f s w i l l be l e f t without a remedy of any kind. 
The comments made on the Senate f loor regarding the UGIA c l e a r l y 
demonstrate that § 63-30-3 of the Act was intended t o codify common law immunity. 
In 1965, when the UGIA was adopted, the courts in many of the surrounding s t a t e s 
had j u d i c i a l l y abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity. As a r e s u l t of 
t h i s j u d i c i a l waiver, the s t a t e s were completely overwhelmed with lawsu i t s . The 
or ig ina l UGIA was intended to codify the common law doctrine of governmental 
immunity in order t o prevent such a j u d i c i a l waiver from occurring in Utah. As 
s tated on the Senate f l oor , the o r i g i n a l UGIA was intended t o "reaffirm" common 
law governmental immunity and then "carve out" various areas in which immunity 
would be waived. A transcr ipt of re levant port ions of the Senate's de l ibera t ions 
are found on pages 9 through 14 of the Addendum. 
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The difficulties in this case, along with the difficulties in 
many previous governmental immunity cases, stem from the manner in 
which the legislature performed task "one" (i.e., the manner in 
which the legislature codified the common law). In its original 
form, the statute performing task "one" read as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act, 
all governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit for any injury which may result from . . . 
the exercise and discharge of a governmental 
function. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1965) (emphasis added). 
By extending immunity to "governmental functions" this statute 
simply codified the common law. As previously discussed, the 
phrase "governmental function" encompasses all activities performed 
by a state entity, as well as those activities that a municipality 
performs while acting as an agent of the state. "The legislature 
was aware of this and . . . they used their language advisedly. . 
. . It [is] plain enough that the intent of the statute was to 
retain the then existing law, both as to immunity and as to 
liability. . . ." Greenhalqh v. Pavson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah 1975). 
The fact that the legislature did not define "governmental 
function" in the UGIA but rather relied upon the common law 
definition of that phrase has resulted in extensive litigation. 
Over the years the common law definition has gradually been 
forgotten. As a result the courts have been forced to hear many 
cases in which the meaning of the phrase was at issue. These cases 
17 
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could have been avoided if the legislature would have set forth the 
common law definition of "governmental function" in the UGIA. The 
legislature remedied this problem in 1987 by amending the UGIA to 
include the common law definition of "governmental function." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989). The validity of this 1987 
amendment is the central issue in the instant case. 
3. Early Court Decisions Under the UGIA Correctly Recognized 
That the "Governmental Function"/"Proprietary Function" 
Distinction Applies Only to Municipal Hospitals, and Not 
to State Hospitals. 
Shortly after the UGIA was adopted this Court applied the Act 
to both a state hospital and to a municipal hospital. Consistent 
with the legislative intent and with the common law, this Court 
applied the "governmental function"/"proprietary function" 
distinction only to the case involving the municipal hospital. The 
distinction was not applied to the state hospital, where this Court 
did not even question the fact that the state* hospital was 
performing a "governmental function." 
In Emerv v. State. 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971), "the 
Utah State Hospital was granted governmental immunity in a case 
involving the death of a mental patient, the necessary implication 
being that the operation of the facility in question was a 
governmental function." Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 
1980), citing Emerv v. State. 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971). 
However, in Greenhalqh v. Payson City. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 
1975) this Court applied the "governmental function"/"proprietary 
function" distinction to a municipal hospital to determine whether 
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it qualified for immunity under the UGIA. The Court correctly 
recognized that the phrase "governmental function" does not include 
proprietary functions of a municipality: 
It is therefore our conclusion that proprietary 
functions of a municipality are not within the 
coverage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Id. at 801 (emphasis added). 
These cases demonstrate that, even after the adoption of the 
UGIA, the "governmental function"/"proprietary function" distinc-
tion was applied only to municipal hospitals. State hospitals had 
always been performing and continued to perform only "governmental 
functions." 
4. In 1978 the Legislature Amended the UGIA to Overrule 
Greenhalah by Extending Immunity to Municipal Hospitals. 
In 1978 the Utah Legislature amended § 63-30-3 of the UGIA. 
This amendment was in "direct response to the decision in 
Greenhalah" that municipal hospitals are not granted immunity under 
the UGIA. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230, 1238 
(Utah 1980). The 1978 amendment read as follows (underlined 
portions were added by the amendment): 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, government a 1 ly-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1978) (emphasis added). 
The effect of the 1978 amendment was to extend the state's 
immunity to municipal hospitals, even if the hospitals were 
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performing "proprietary functions." In such situations, the Act 
thus denied individuals of a remedy against a municipal hospital 
that had previously existed at common law. 
Significantly, the 1978 amendment did not affect the immunity 
of state hospitals. State hospitals already qualified for immunity 
as "governmental functions" under the UGIA and did not need to be 
singled out for a specific grant of immunity. Nonetheless, after 
the 1978 amendment, state hospitals qualified for immunity under 
the UGIA as not only a "governmental function," but also as a 
"governmentally-owned hospital." 
5. Recent Court Decisions Have Mistakenly Applied the 
"Governmental Function"/"Proprietary Function" 
distinction to State Hospitals. 
The fact that the 1978 amendment extends immunity to state 
hospitals as both "governmental functions" and as "governmentally 
owned hospitals" has resulted in confusion in the courts. More 
specifically, the amendment has caused the courts to forget that 
all state entities, including state hospitals, qualify as 
"governmental functions" as of right. Instead, the courts have 
recently focused on the "governmentally-owned hospital" portion of 
the statute that was added in 1978 when determining whether state 
hospitals qualify for immunity under the UGIA. 
The first government hospital decision interpreting the 1978 
amendment was Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). Just like 
the instant case, Frank also involved an action for negligence 
against the University Medical Center. The defendants in Frank 
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moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the University 
Medical Center was immune from suit under the UGIA. This Court 
ultimately concluded that the University Medical Center did in fact 
qualify as a "governmental function" under the UGIA, and thus 
qualified for limited immunity. However, in concluding that the 
University Medical Center was engaged in a "governmental function" 
the Court relied heavily upon the language added in the 1978 amend-
ment. The Court apparently felt that this new language evidenced 
a legislative intent to include the Medical Center within the 
definition of "governmental function." The Court did not recognize 
that the medical center already qualified as a "governmental 
function" as of its own right under the common law principles 
previously discussed: 
[The 1978 amendment] granted immunity from suit 
for injury relating to the public ownership and 
operation of a hospital, nursing home, or other 
health care facility. . . . [W]e are 
disinclined, as a matter of judicial policy, to 
disregard the obvious manifestation of 
legislative intent reflected in the amendment. 
For this reason, we hold the operation of a 
governmentally-owned health care facility such 
as the University Medical Center to be a 
"governmental function" as contemplated by the 
statute prior to amendment. 
Id. at 519 (emphasis added). 
While Frank correctly concluded that the University Medical 
Center is engaged in a "governmental function," the Court 
apparently found it necessary to rely upon the 1978 amendment to 
reach such a result rather than simply concluding that the medical 
center qualified as a "governmental function" as of its own right. 
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To this extent, Frank strayed from the original intent of the UGIA 
and also from the common law. 
The second case to analyze the immunity of the University 
Hospital under the 1978 UGIA was Condemarin v. University Hosp., 
775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). Condemarin is extremely important to the 
outcome of this case because, in the trial court, plaintiffs relied 
on this opinion to support nearly every aspect of their case. 
Condemarin involved an action against the University Hospital 
arising from the negligent treatment of the plaintiff's child. The 
plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking to have portions of 
the UGIA declared unconstitutional. When the plaintiff's motion 
was denied, she appealed to this Court. 
On appeal, summary judgment was granted in the plaintiff's 
favor and the liability cap contained in the UGIA was declared to 
be unconstitutional insofar as it limited the liability of the 
University Hospital. The plurality's holding was based primarily 
upon its interpretation of the 1978 amendment to the UGIA. The 
plurality interpreted the 1978 amendment as extending immunity to 
the University Hospital as a "governmentally-owned hospital" rather 
than as a "governmental function": 
The net result of [the 1978 amendment] is that 
government-owned health care facilities . . . 
have been singled out for . . . immunity for 
non-governmental functions. 
* * * 
The legislature did not make the operation of a 
health care facility a "governmental function" 
as contemplated by the statute. . . . Rather, 
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the legislature simply added to the category of 
government entities covered by § 60-30-3 (i.e., 
those exercising governmental functions) a new 
category consisting of government-owned health 
care facilities, whether or not those facilities 
are exercising governmental or non-governmental 
functions. The plain language and structure of 
§ 63-30-3 admit of no other construction. 
* * * 
The [governmental immunity] act does not purport 
to define the operation of a hospital per se as 
the exercise of a governmental function; it only 
gives hospitals the same status under the act as 
government entities which are performing 
governmental functions. 
Id. at 350-52 (emphasis in original) . See also Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 843 n.10 (Utah 1990). 
As this language from Condemarin indicates, the plurality was 
not aware that the University Hospital, as a state entity, 
qualified for immunity as a "governmental function" and not just as 
a "governmentally-owned hospital." If the plurality had been aware 
of this fact, it would have, by its own admission, upheld the 
validity of the statutory liability limit: 
It is true, as defendants argue, that there is 
no fundamental right to recover unlimited 
damages from government entities performing 
governmental functions. 
Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
However, the plurality did not consider the University 
Hospital to be a "governmental function" because, after analyzing 
the 1978 amendment, it determined that there was "no statutory or 
factual basis for such an assumption." Id. 
Thus, the plurality held that the 1978 amendment extended 
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immunity to the University Hospital as a "non-governmental 
function" rather than as a "governmental function." 
The plurality's incorrect belief that state entities were 
capable of performing "proprietary functions" at common law led the 
plurality to incorrectly assume that the "governmental function"/ 
"proprietary function" distinction applies to all government 
entities, and not just to municipalities: 
Immunity from liability existed as a matter of 
common law in Utah for government entities 
engaging in governmental, as opposed to 
proprietary, activities. 
* * * 
At common law the proprietary or nongovern-
mental functions of government entities were not 
protected from liability in Utah. . . . 
Id. at 349 and 351 (emphasis in original). 
Significantly, all of the cases cited in support of this 
holding were cases involving municipalities. See Id. at 350. Not 
a single case was cited in which the "governmental function"/ 
"proprietary function" distinction applied to a state entity.2 As 
already demonstrated in detail, such a distinction did not apply to 
state entities because state entities were only capable of 
performing "governmental functions" at common law. 
The plurality's misapplication of the "governmental function"/ 
"proprietary function" distinction to state entities is easy to 
2
 Those cases cited were: Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180r 89 P.714 
(1907); Sehv v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 535, 126 P. 691 (1912); Alder v. Salt 
Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 P. 1102 (1924); Rollow v. Oaden City, 66 Utah 475, 
243 P. 791 (1926); Niblock v, Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P,2d 800 (1941) • 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
understand, in light of the fact that the issue had not been 
recognized or briefed by the parties. Rather, the brief submitted 
by the University Hospital erroneously assumed that the distinction 
applied to state entities: 
Under [the] common law there was always 
discrimination between a person injured by a 
state employee functioning in a government 
capacity and one injured by a state employee 
functioning in a proprietary capacity. Under 
sovereign immunity the person injured in the 
governmental function was absolutely barred from 
any recovery whereas a complete recovery was 
possible as to the proprietary function. 
* * * 
Since government entities were immune from suit 
for government activities the important 
distinction as to the liability of the entity 
itself was whether the function was proprietary 
or governmental. 
Brief of University Hospital, pp. 35 & 41. (Addendum pp. 15-16) . 
As illustrated, the defendant in Condemarin misstated to this 
Court that the "governmental function"/"proprietary function" 
distinction applied to state entities. The plaintiff did nothing 
to remedy this misstatement. Consequently, this Court was 
erroneously led to believe that the distinction applied to state 
entities at common law. 
Based upon the incorrect belief that the 1978 amendment 
extended immunity to the University Hospital as a "proprietary 
function" and that state entities were liable for "proprietary 
functions" at common law, the Condemarin plurality held that the 
liability cap contained in the 1978 UGIA was unconstitutional. The 
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plurality stated that the cap deprived plaintiffs of a common law 
remedy against the University Hospital in violation of the "open 
courts" provision of the Utah Constitution. The plurality's 
reasoning is set forth below in its own words. 
"The right to recover for personal injuries [is] an important 
substantive right [guaranteed by the 'open courts' provision 
contained in Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution]." Id. 
at 360. "[The 'open courts' clause provides] that an individual 
may not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to 
protect basic individual rights." Id. at 357. "The term 'remedy,' 
as used in the open courts clause, means the full, fair and 
complete remedy provided by the common law." Id. at 372. "At 
common law the proprietary or non-governmental functions of 
government entities were not protected from liability in Utah. . . 
." Id. at 351 (emphasis in original). "Consequently, immunity for 
. . . government entities performing non-governmental functions was 
created, not retained, by the 1978 amendment. Such immunity was a 
new development." Id. (emphasis in original). "To the extent that 
§ 63-3 0-3 created immunity for employees of government-owned health 
care facilities not engaged in governmental functions, it created 
immunity where none had existed at common law." Id. at 3 60. 
Under this analysis, the Condemarin plurality determined that 
the 1978 UGIA conflicted with the "open courts" provision of the 
Utah Constitution. As a result, the plurality subjected the Act to 
"heightened scrutiny" under both an equal protection and a due 
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process analysis. The result of the heightened scrutiny was that 
the liability cap contained in the 1978 UGIA was found to be 
unconstitutional with regard to the University Hospital. 
As this discussion demonstrates, Condemarin was based upon an 
erroneous assumption that state entities were capable of performing 
"proprietary functions" at common law and were liable for torts 
arising out of those functions. This erroneous assumption, caused 
by inadequate briefing, led the Condemarin plurality to construe 
the 1978 amendment as extending immunity to the University Hospital 
where none previously existed. Because the underpinning of the 
Condemarin holding was based upon the erroneous assumption urged by 
the University Hospital, the decision should be overturned and the 
liability cap contained in the UGIA should be upheld as to the 
University Hospital. 
6. The 1987 Amendment of the UGIA Corrects the Error Made in 
Condemarin and Reinstates the Limited Liability Status of 
the University Hospital. 
Even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment in this case. In 1987 the legislature once again 
amended the UGIA. This amendment rectified the concerns raised by 
the plurality in Condemarin by demonstrating once and for all that 
the University Hospital qualifies for immunity as a "governmental 
function," and not as a "non-governmental function" as suggested by 
Condemarin. The amendment made this change by adding the common 
law definition of "governmental function" to the UGIA. This 
definition includes all state activities, including the activities 
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of the University Hospital, within the definition of "governmental 
function": 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken in a 
dual capacity, essential to or not essential to 
a government or governmental function, or could 
be performed by private enterprise or private 
persons. 
* * * 
(3) "Governmental Entity" means the state and 
its political subdivisions as defined in this 
chapter. 
* * * 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and 
includes any office, department, agency, 
authority, commission, board, institution, 
hospital, college, university, or other 
instrumentality of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (1989) (emphasis added). 
This definition of "governmental function" alleviates the 
concerns expressed in Condemarin over the fact that immunity was 
being extended to a "non-governmental function." Under the 1987 
amendment the University Hospital's activities now qualify for 
immunity as "governmental functions." The amendment thus 
reinstates the liability limit of $250,000 to the University 
Hospital. 
By including all state activities within the definition of 
"governmental function," the 1987 amendment simply codifies the 
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common law, as per the original intent of the UGIA. It is 
difficult to understand how plaintiffs can argue that the 1987 
amendment is unconstitutional when the common law has never been 
unconstitutional. As shown below, the 1987 UGIA is constitutional 
in every respect. 
B. THE 1987 UGIA, WHICH LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY 
HOSPITAL TO $250,000, IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
1. The 1987 Amendment is Presumed to be Valid. 
When dealing with constitutional issues, the Utah courts have 
repeatedly emphasized that statutes carry a strong presumption of 
validity: 
When we are engaged in statutory construction, 
we are obligated to construe statutes when 
possible to effectuate the legislative intent 
and to avoid potential constitutional conflicts. 
It is also a well established rule of statutory 
construction that statutes are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity; and should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which thev can be found to 
come within the constitutional framework. 
Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 739 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
This Court has repeatedly stressed that the party attacking 
the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of proof. 
See Utah Associated Mun. Power Svs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 789 
P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990) (The burden of proof is on those who 
would have the Court strike down a statute). Additionally, "the 
challenger must prove abuse of legislative discretion beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Sambs v. City of Brookfield. 293 N.W.2d 504, 
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511 (Wis. 1980). See also. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 
(Utah 1974) . 
In accordance with these principles, the 1987 UGIA is entitled 
to a strong presumption of validity. This statute must be given 
effect until plaintiffs can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statute is unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs have not even begun to satisfy their burden of 
proof in this case. In the trial court defendant Sharp relied upon 
two different statutes in support of summary judgment. The first 
statute was the 1987 amendment that is at issue on this appeal. 
(See R. 542, 551). This statute constituted the primary argument 
advanced by Sharp in support of summary judgment and was also 
adopted by defendant Healy. In spite of this fact, plaintiffs' 
opposing memoranda completely failed to address the 
constitutionality of the 1987 amendment and instead addressed only 
the alternative argument being asserted by defendants. The only 
reference made to the 1987 amendment throughout plaintiffs' entire 
opposing memoranda is found in a single-sentence footnote that 
summarily concludes that the amendment is "invalid": 
The legislature's enactment of § 63-30-2(4) in 
1987 purporting to define 'governmental 
function7 as anything the government does or 
doesn't do regardless of whether the act is 
"core" or "unique" or "proprietary" is clearly 
invalid under the Supreme Court's standard. 
Plaintiffs7 Supplemental Memorandum, p. 46 n.4. 
This single response is woefully inadequate to overcome the 
strong presumption of validity that attaches to legislative 
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enactments. Nonetheless, in spite of plaintiffs' complete failure 
to address the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment, the trial 
court somehow concluded that the 1987 amendment is unconstitutional 
"for the reasons specified in plaintiffs' memoranda." (R. 725). 
No other explanation was given. 
Based upon this fact alone, the trial court clearly erred in 
denying defendants' motions for summary judgment. In order to 
avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must prove that the 1987 
amendment is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden of proof by any stretch of the imagination. 
In any event, it is clear that plaintiffs could not satisfy 
their burden of proof even if they were to try. As demonstrated 
below, the liability limit contained in the 1987 UGIA is 
constitutional in every respect. 
2. The 1987 UGIA Does Not Violate the "Open Courts" Clause 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution found in 
Article I, Section 11 provides as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay. . . . 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11. 
In order to prove that the 1987 UGIA is unconstitutional, 
plaintiffs must first prove that the statute conflicts with the 
"open courts" clause quoted above. This is true regardless of 
whether plaintiffs attack the statute under an equal protection 
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theory, a due process theory, or some other constitutional theory. 
Unless the statute violates the "open courts" clause, the statute 
will not be subjected to the heightened level of scrutiny necessary 
to overturn the statute under any constitutional theory. See 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359 & 373. 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment must be granted 
because plaintiffs cannot prove that the 1987 UGIA violates the 
"open courts" clause. This Court and the courts of virtually every 
other state have held that the "open courts" clause only applies to 
causes of action that existed when the state constitution was 
ratified. When the Utah Constitution was ratified, individuals had 
no remedy against state entities whatsoever because of the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, as previously discussed. Thus, subsequent 
statutes codifying governmental immunity, such as the 1987 
amendment, do not deprive plaintiffs of any remedy because, at 
common law, they had no remedy. 
As pointed out by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627 (Utah 1983), Utah's "open courts" clause does not effect the 
state's immunity. In Madsen, the plaintiffs filed suit against the 
State of Utah and its commissioner of financial institutions. The 
trial court found that the action was barred by the 1978 UGIA and 
dismissed the case. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that 
statutory and common law sovereign immunity deprived them of a 
common law remedy in violation of the "open courts" clause. 
However, this Court disagreed and held that the "open courts" 
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clause has no effect on the state's immunity because, at common 
law, individuals had no remedy against the state: 
Sovereign immunity — the principle that the 
state cannot be sued in its own courts without 
its consent — was a well-settled principle of 
American common law at the time Utah became a 
state. Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, which prescribes that all courts 
shall be open and persons shall not be barred 
from using them to redress injuries, was not 
meant to create a new remedy or a new right of 
action• Consequently, Article I, Section 11 
worked no change in the principle of sovereign 
immunity, and sovereign immunity is not 
unconstitutional under that section. 
Id. at 629 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
This principle was further illustrated in Brown v, Wightman, 
47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915). The plaintiff in Brown was 
attempting to bring a wrongful death action. Because wrongful 
death actions did not exist at common law the case was dismissed. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was being denied a remedy 
in violation of the "open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution. 
This argument was rejected by this Court: 
[The "open courts" clause] is a general 
provision, which in the same or similar language 
will be found in the constitutions of at least 
28 states in the union. . . . The courts have, 
however, always considered and treated those 
provisions, not as creating new rights, or as 
giving new remedies where none otherwise are 
given, but as placing a limitation upon the 
legislature to prevent that branch of the state 
government from closing the doors of the courts 
against any person who has a legal right which 
is enforceable in accordance with some known 
remedy. Where no right of action is given, 
however, or no remedy exists, under either the 
common law or some statute, those constitutional 
provisions create none. . . . The right and 
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power, as well as the duty, of creating rights 
and to provide remedies, lies with the 
legislature, and not with the courts. Courts 
can only protect and enforce existing rights, 
and they may do that only in accordance with 
established and known remedies. 
Id. at 366-67, 47 Utah at 34 (emphasis added). 
Utah is by no means alone in holding that a state's immunity 
is not affected by an "open courts" clause. Indeed, the vast 
majority of states have similarly recognized that, because states 
were absolutely immune from suit at common law, statutes that 
extend immunity to state entities do not deprive individuals of a 
remedy in violation of an "open courts" clause. One of many 
examples is found in Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015 
(Kan. 1976). In Brown a statute reimposing governmental immunity 
was challenged under an "open courts" clause similar to Utah's: 
All persons, for injuries suffered in person, 
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, and justice administered without 
delay. 
Id. at 1023 (quoting Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights). 
The plaintiffs claimed that the state governmental immunity statute 
denied them a remedy against the government in violation of this 
constitutional provision. However, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld 
the validity of the governmental immunity statute: 
Section 18 [the "open courts" clause] does not 
create any new rights, but merely recognizes 
long established systems of law existing prior 
to the adoption of the constitution. Since the 
right to sue the state for torts was a right 
denied at common law, such right is not 
protected by Section 18. . . . It seems 
unlikely framers of our constitution intended 
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Section 18 to abrogate governmental immunity. 
Were this true, our early court decisions would 
have reached that result. Instead, our prior 
decisions uphold governmental immunity. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
A similar challenge was made in Martinez v. Harris County, 808 
S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App. 1991), under a constitutional provision 
stating that, "all courts shall be open, and every person for an 
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law." Id. at 261 (quoting Texas 
Const., art. I, § 13) . As in Brown, the Martinez court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act: 
In order for the open courts analysis to apply, 
there must be some abrogation of a litigants 
right to bring a cause of action, either common 
law or statutory. . . . 
* * * 
[Plaintiff1 did not have a common law cause of 
action for suit against Harris County; he only 
had a right to sue the county under the Texas 
Tort Claims Act. Under the common law doctrine 
of sovereign immunity the state and its 
political subdivisions . . . may not be held 
liable for torts absent a statutory provision 
creating such liability. The Texas Tort Claims 
Act provides the exception to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity for counties. Thus, 
[plaintiff's"j remedy is not rooted in the common 
law, but is statutorily created. Because he 
cannot establish he had a cognizable cause of 
action that was restricted by rthe statute in 
question], he has failed to show a violation of 
the open courts provision of the constitution. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
Numerous other courts have similarly concluded that "open 
courts" provisions do not affect a state's immunity. See, e.g. , 
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Gasper v, Freidel, 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990) (The "open courts" 
clause of the state constitution is not violated when no remedy 
existed at common law); Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506, 
509-512 (Or. 1989) (sovereign immunity was firmly in place when the 
state constitution was ratified; thus a statutory liability cap is 
not unconstitutional under "open courts" clause); Morris v. Blake, 
552 A. 2d 844 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (No cause of action existed 
against the state at common law and thus the "open courts" clause 
of the state constitution does not affect the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 733 S.W.2d 
290 (Tex. App. 1987) (The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity 
preceded the "open courts" clause of the state constitution and 
thus the "open courts" clause does not affect the constitutionality 
of governmental immunity statutes); High-Grade Oil Co. . Inc. v. 
Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736 (S.D. 1980) (The doctrine of sovereign 
immunity predates the constitution and thus the "open courts" 
clause of the state constitution has no effect on state statutes 
imposing governmental immunity). 
As demonstrated, in Utah and in virtually every other state an 
"open courts" clause does not effect statutes granting immunity to 
state entities because the statutes do not deprive individuals of 
a common law remedy. At common law individuals had no remedy 
against state entities whatsoever. It was not until the UGIA 
became effective in 1966 that individuals were granted a remedy 
against Utah and its agencies, but even then the remedy has always 
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been limited in amount. The only exception is this Courts 
decision in Condemarin, which granted an unlimited remedy because 
it was erroneously led to believe that the University Hospital's 
activities were "non-governmental functions" and thus subject to 
suit at common law. In all other cases, individuals have never had 
an unlimited remedy against the University Hospital since the time 
of statehood. 
It is ironic that plaintiffs are attempting to have the UGIA 
declared unconstitutional. If they succeed, plaintiffs will have 
revoked the state's consent to be sued. The state's immunity would 
then be governed by the common law, under which the state would not 
be subject to any liability whatsoever. In such an event 
plaintiffs would have no recovery against the University Hospital, 
making their $250,000 settlement more than reasonable. 
3. The 1987 UGIA Does Not Violate Equal Protection or Due 
Process. 
In order to prove that the 1987 UGIA violates equal protection 
or due process, plaintiffs must first prove that the Act violates 
the "open courts" clause. Unless the "open courts" clause is 
violated, plaintiffs will not be able to obtain the heightened 
level of scrutiny needed to overturn the 1987 UGIA. Instead, the 
Court will apply a "rational basis test," under which "the statute 
will surely be found constitutional." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359 
(See all comments in italics). 
Because the 1987 UGIA does not violate the "open courts" 
clause, as demonstrated, the clause cannot be used indirectly to 
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obtain a heightened level of judicial scrutiny under an equal 
protection or due process analysis. This was illustrated in Estate 
of Caraill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979). 
In Caraill the plaintiffs sought several million dollars in 
damages from their local government for personal injuries. The 
government claimed that its liability was limited to $50,000 by 
statute. The plaintiffs then filed a declaratory action to 
determine the constitutionality of the liability cap. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the liability cap violated the 
"open courts," equal protection, and due process clauses of the 
state constitution. However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs on all counts. The court first held 
that the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause. The 
court then had to decide how strictly it would scrutinize the 
statute under its equal protection and due process analysis. The 
plaintiffs argued that a heightened level of scrutiny should be 
applied because the statute conflicted with the "open courts" 
clause by inhibiting the right to recover for one's injuries. 
However, the court rejected this argument and said: 
Where . . . the statute under consideration does 
not directly violate part 1, article 14 of our 
constitution [the 'open courts' clause], we fail 
to see how it could violate the same 
constitutional provision indirectly under the 
guise of equal protection analysis. 
Id. at 707. 
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Statutes that limit the liability of government entities are 
certainly constitutional, as evidenced by the vast majority of 
cases throughout the country. This is true regardless of the form 
of the attack. The cases have been so one-sided that an annotation 
has recently summarized the opinions as follows: 
Courts have almost uniformly recognized that 
legislative bodies have the power to prescribe 
Tliability] limits, and that the limits 
prescribed are constitutionally valid. Though 
they may abridge the remedies of victims of 
government, as opposed to private torts, damage 
limitation statutes or ordinances are almost 
unanimously viewed as having a rational basis in 
the government's need to provide for effective 
risk management. . . . In addition to repelling 
equal protection attacks on damage limitation 
laws, the courts have also consistently rejected 
arguments that such enactments violate due 
process, or that they abridge state 
constitutional guarantees of access to courts 
for redress of grievances, or impair vested 
rights. 
Annot., 43 A.L.R.4th 19, 25 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Not surprisingly, nearly all cases involving State Hospitals 
and Medical Centers have similarly concluded that statutory 
liability limits are constitutional. A prime example is found in 
Sibley v. Board of Superiors, 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985). The 
plaintiff in Sibley had been transferred from a private hospital to 
a University Medical Center. As a result of her treatment at the 
Medical Center the plaintiff suffered massive brain damage, leaving 
her with the functional IQ of a 10 year old child. The plaintiff 
had a normal life expectancy, but would be unable to take care of 
herself. Prior to trial the plaintiff's medical expenses exceeded 
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$423,000. It was expected that a much greater amount would be 
required to meet her future long-term needs. 
At trial judgment was entered for the plaintiff but the 
state's liability was limited to $500,000 pursuant to statute. The 
plaintiff appealed, claiming that the liability limit was 
unconstitutional under the "open courts", equal protection, and due 
process clauses. In deciding the issue, the court first held that 
the statute did not violate the "open courts" clause. As a result, 
the court only scrutinized the statute under "the lesser standard 
of rational basis [scrutiny]." Id. at 157. The court then 
concluded that the rational basis test was satisfied and that the 
liability cap did not "unconstitutionally violate either the equal 
protection or due process clauses of the state or federal 
constitutions. . . . " Id. at 158. 
Thus, Sibley upheld the statutory liability cap placed on the 
University Medical Center. Other cases involving government 
hospitals have produced the same results. See Tarrant County Hosp. 
Dist. v. Rav, 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App. 1986) (statute limiting 
liability of county hospital to $100,000 does not violate equal 
protection); Neal v. Donahue. 611 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1980) (statute 
extending immunity to state hospital does not violate "open 
courts," equal protection, or due process); Crowe v. Harton 
Memorial Hosp.f 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. 1979) (statute limiting 
the liability of a government hospital to $20,000 does not violate 
"open courts," equal protection, or due process); Fritz v. Regents 
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of Univ. of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978) (statute limiting a 
person/s ability to sue the University Hospital does not violate 
equal protection); Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan. 1977) 
(statute extending immunity to University Medical Center does not 
violate constitution); Malone v. University of Kansas Medical 
Center, 552 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute extending immunity to 
University Medical Center does not violate constitution). 
As the preceding authorities overwhelmingly demonstrate, 
statutes that limit the liability of state hospitals are 
constitutional in every respect. Thus, the 1987 UGIA legally 
limited plaintiffs' recovery against the University Hospital to 
$250,000. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise. 
C. THE CONTROL OP GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS GIVEN TO THE 
LEGISLATURE. 
Virtually every court throughout the country agrees that the 
legislature, and not the courts, controls the area of governmental 
immunity. See, e.g., Bailey Serv. & Supply Corp. v. State, 533 
P. 2d 882, 883 (Utah 1975) ("Only the legislature can waive 
sovereign immunity. . . . " ) ; Bingham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah 
582, 589, 223 P.2d 432, 436 (1950) ("If . . . [state agencies] are 
to be stripped of immunity, the stripping process should be by 
legislative enactment and not by court decree." Similarly, "Under 
our constitution the power to make departments of the state respond 
in damages for torts rests with the legislature, and without 
legislative enactment we are unable to impose any liability or 
obligation. . . . " Id. at 438); Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & 
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Smith. Inc.. v. Jacks. 960 F.2d 911, 913 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Only 
congress, not the courts, can waive the sovereign immunity of the 
United States. Therefore, in the absence of clear congressional 
consent, then, there is no jurisdiction to entertain suits against 
the United States."); Alewine v. State. 803 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo. 
1991) ("The power to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
state is liable to suit is vested in the legislature."); State v. 
Peruskov, 800 P.2d 15, 18 (Ariz. App. 1990) ("The . . . legislature 
is the only state institution with the power to determine whether 
the state shall be subject to suit."); Morris v. Blake. 552 A.2d 
844, 850 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Only an act of the general 
assembly may waive sovereign immunity."); Stout v. Grand Prairie 
Indep. Dist.. 733 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. App. 1987) ("[The] 
determination of the wisdom, justice, necessity or reasonableness 
of [governmental immunity] is the duty of the legislature, not the 
courts."); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray. 712 S.W.2d 271, 273 
(Tex. App. 1986) ("If the doctrine of sovereign immunity ought to 
be re-examined and abolished, or further waived, then surely that 
would be the proper task of the legislature and not this 
intermediate court."); Rathbun v. Department of Highways. 496 P.2d 
937, 938 (Idaho 1972) ("It is clear that . . . immunity [can] be 
waived only through express action of the legislature."); Taylor v. 
State. 311 P.2d 733, 734 (Nev. 1957) ("It is not within the power 
of the courts . . . to strip the sovereign of its armor. . . . It 
is the legislature alone which has the power to waive immunity or 
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to authorize such waiver."). 
Because the control of governmental immunity is given solely 
to the legislature, this Court has recognized that a judicial 
waiver of the state's immunity violates the separation of powers 
clause contained in Utah Const., art. V § 1: 
To [waive the state's immunity] would do 
violence to our concept of separation of powers, 
we believe. We have left to the constitution 
and legislature the matter of waiver of immunity 
in such cases. 
* * * 
We must not judicially legislate, but must, in 
our tri-partite form of government, leave to the 
legislature whether there should be a waiver of 
immunity. . . . 
Cobia v. Rov City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 377-78, 366 P.2d 986, 988 
(1961) . See also State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 71, 368 P.2d 585, 
589 (1962) ("any drainage of tax payers' funds by abolition of the 
doctrine [of sovereign immunity], is the subject of legislative 
attention in our tri-partite system of government, — not the 
court's.") (J. Henroid, rebutting the dissenting opinion). 
As evidenced above, the control of governmental immunity is 
unquestionably vested in the legislature. Only the legislature has 
the power to waive the state's immunity. The trial court 
encroached upon the legislature's power when it overturned the 1987 
UGIA and completely waived the University Hospital's immunity. 
Thus, the trial court's ruling should be reversed and defendants' 
motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
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D. THE LEGISLATURE HAS POWER TO REIMPOSE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
AFTER IT HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY THE COURTS. 
Because governmental immunity is controlled by the 
legislature, courts uniformly agree that the legislature has the 
power to reimpose governmental immunity after it has been abrogated 
by the courts. One recent example is Randall v. Fairmount City 
Police Dep't., 412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991). 
In Randall the plaintiff filed suit against a government 
entity. The suit was dismissed under the governmental immunity 
act. On appeal, the plaintiff pointed out that prior judicial 
decisions had abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
Although this immunity had been reinstated by the legislature, the 
plaintiff claimed that the statute reimposing immunity was 
unconstitutional because it deprived her of a remedy in violation 
of the "open courts" clause of the state constitution. The West 
Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the 
validity of the statute reimposing governmental immunity: 
Our holding is supported by almost all of the 
authorities elsewhere. Virtually every reported 
case involving a "certain remedy" challenge to 
the broad, legislative reinstatement of local 
governmental tort immunity, after judicial 
abrogation of such immunity originating at 
common law, has rejected that challenge. . . . 
Consistent with the great weight of authority, 
we hold that the . . . provisions . . . do not 
violate the certain remedy provision of . . . 
the constitution of West Virginia. 
Id. at 744-45 (emphasis added) (citing Hardin v. City of Devalls 
Bluff, 508 S.W.2d 559 (Ark. 1974); Sadler v. New Castle County, 524 
A.2d 18, 25 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987), aff'd, 565 A.2d 917, 923-24 
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(Del. 1989); Davis v. Chicago Hous. Auth. , 555 N.E. 2d 343, 345-46 
(111. 1990); Adams v. City of Peoria, 396 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (111. 
App. 1979); Carroll v. County of York. 437 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa. 
1981); Robson v. Penn Hills School Dist.. 437 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 
733 S.W.2d 290, 293-95, 296-97 (Tex. App. 1987), writ of error 
ref d (no reversible error) (Tex. Oct. 7, 1987), cert, denied., 485 
U.S. 907 (1988); Brown v. Wichita State Univ.. 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 
1976); Bruce v. Wichita State Univ.. 429 U.S. 806 (1976); Cords v. 
State, 214 N.W. 2d 405, 410 (Wis. 1974)). 
Consistent with this majority rule, the courts have routinely 
held that legislatures can re-extend immunity to University 
Hospitals and Medical Centers after the courts have taken it away. 
In Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado. 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978) , 
the plaintiff sued the state for injuries she sustained as a 
patient in a state hospital. The defendants were granted summary 
judgment and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that a portion of the 
state's governmental immunity act was unconstitutional. However, 
the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the statute. The 
court explained that the legislature had validly reinstated 
governmental immunity: 
The General Assembly restored governmental 
immunities in part by its enactment of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. . . . In doing so, 
it had full authority to specify what actions 
may be brought against the State and its 
subdivisions. 
Id. at 25-26. See also Whitmire v. Jewell. 573 P.2d 573 (Kan. 
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1977) (statute re-extending immunity to University Medical Center 
is constitutional); Malone v. Univ. of Kansas Medical Center, 552 
P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976) (statute reimposing immunity of University 
Medical Center does not violate constitution). 
As demonstrated above, the Utah legislature clearly has the 
ability to reinstate the immunity of the University Hospital by 
including the hospital's activities within the definition of 
"governmental function." This power was already recognized by this 
Court in Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Prior to Frank, this Court had held that at least some 
government-owned hospitals were capable of performing "proprietary 
functions" within the meaning of the original UGIA. See Greenhalah 
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). As a result, the Utah 
Legislature amended the UGIA in 1978 to extend immunity to all 
government entities engaged in "the exercise of a governmental 
function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility." Frank, 613 P. 2d at 519 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3 (1978)). 
After scrutinizing the 1978 amendment, this Court found that 
the amendment was intended to reinstate immunity to government-
owned hospitals by including the hospitals within the definition of 
"governmental function." Significantly, this Court recognized the 
legislature's right to pass such an amendment and upheld the 
apparent reinstatement of immunity to the government hospitals: 
[W]e are disinclined, as a matter of judicial 
policy, to disregard the obvious manifestation 
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of legislative intent reflected in the [1978] 
amendment. For this reason, we hold the 
operation of a governmentally-owned health care 
facility such as the University Medical Center 
to be a "governmental function" as contemplated 
by the statute. . . . 
Id. at 519. 
Frank thus illustrates a very important principle; namely, 
that this Court will characterize the activities of the University 
Hospital as "governmental functions" when it perceives that the 
legislature intended the activities to be so characterized. 
Although other court opinions have reinterpreted the 1978 
amendment, this Court has recognized that Frank remains controlling 
for the principle cited herein. See Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 
794 P.2d 838, 843 n.10 (Utah 1990). 
The Condemarin opinion itself reflects this Court's deference 
to the legislature on governmental immunity issues. Indeed, the 
plurality's opinion was premised upon the perceived legislative 
intent of the 1978 amendment to extend immunity to the University 
Hospital as a "non-governmental function" rather than as a 
"governmental function." Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 351-52. Now, the 
recent 1987 amendment shows that the legislature's intent is 
exactly the opposite and that the activities of the University 
Hospital are intended to be "governmental functions." This Court 
should adhere to this more recent expression of intent and 
acknowledge that the activities of the University Hospital are in 
fact "governmental functions." This is the same situation that was 
previously presented to this Court in Frank, wherein this Court 
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abandoned prior precedent and allowed the legislature to include 
the activities of the University Hospital within the definition of 
"governmental function." Frank, standing alone, thus provides 
ample precedent for reversing the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
In Condemarin, a plurality of this Court concluded that the 
1978 UGIA was unconstitutional insofar as it limited the liability 
of the University Hospital. This decision was based on an 
erroneous assumption that, at common law, state hospitals were 
capable of performing "proprietary functions" and were subject to 
suit. This erroneous assumption led the plurality to construe the 
1978 amendment as extending immunity to the University Hospital's 
activities as "non-governmental functions" in violation of the 
"open courts" clause of the Utah Constitution. Because of its 
erroneous underpinnings, Condemarin should be overturned and 
defendants' motions for summary judgment should be granted. 
Even if Condemarin is upheld, defendants are still entitled to 
summary judgment. Since the cause of action in Condemarin arose 
the Utah Legislature has amended the UGIA to include the activities 
of the University Hospital within the definition of "governmental 
function." This amendment alleviates the concerns raised in 
Condemarin and once again limits the liability of the University 
Hospital to $250,000. Plaintiffs received $250,000 under the terms 
of their settlement agreement, thus obtaining the maximum recovery 
from the University Hospital allowed by law. 
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To avoid summary judgment plaintiffs must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the 1987 UGIA is unconstitutional. In order 
to prove the Act unconstitutional, plaintiffs must first prove that 
the Act deprives them of a common law remedy in violation of the 
"open courts" clause. Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden of proof 
because no common law remedy existed against the state. The Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act thus remains applicable, limiting 
plaintiffs7 claim against the University Medical Center to 
$250,000. Plaintiffs received this full amount, rendering their 
settlement reasonable as a matter of law. 
In light of these facts, defendant Roger Sharp respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his 
summary judgment motion and to order the trial court to enter 
summary judgment in 
DATED this 
BY (AT)(^$ f(. fuQ&fr^ 
David R. Nielson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Roger T. Sharp 
day of^^U^3^f. , 1992. 
Glenn C. Manni N 
103999bc 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
A - 1 
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UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, em-
ployees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of 
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with 
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent 
contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position re-
ceives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivi-
sions as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or 
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is char-
acterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental func-
tion, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential 
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school dis-
trict, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corpora-
tion. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, es-
tate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1; 
1983, ch. 129, $ 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions of this sec-
tion and renumbered the subsections accord-
ingly, added present Subsection (4), and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
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63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.—Except as may 
be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said en-
tities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3. 
(Original — 1965) 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental enti-
ties [-shaH-bej are immune form suit for any injury which Imey-pesuk-fewn 
-t-he-aefctvkiea-of -satd-eftt-kies-whepem -sekt-eftfcky- *s -engaged-m -khe -exercise 
^ndniieehai^e-ef^-^evei^fnental--kmetioH results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility. 
(1978 amendment) 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical t raining program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natura l disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ment inserted "and other natural disasters" in 
ch. 93, § 1. the second paragraph. 
(Controlling statute) 
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63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental entity 
or employee. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HIPWELL, SHELLY 
VS 
SHARP, ROGER T 
HEALY, TIM W 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910905017 CV 
DATE 03/30/92 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND AFTER HAVING HEARD ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
COURT HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION UNDER ADVISEMENT, RULES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED, 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION 
THERETO. 
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
3. THE ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS PIVOTAL AND DISPOSITIVE. 
THIS COURT WOULD URGE DEFENDANTS TO PURSUE AN INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THEIR MOTIONS. 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718) 
GARY RHYS JOHNSON, Esq. (#5729) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHELLY HIPWELL, an 
individual by and through 
her guardians, SHERRY 
JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGER SHARP, TIM W. HEALY, 
and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910905017 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Roger T. 
Sharp and Tim W. Healy came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled court on March 30, 1992 at the hour of 10:30 a.m. 
Defendant Sharp appeared by and through his counsel of record, 
Glenn C. Hanni and Strong & Hanni and Defendant Healy appeared 
by and through his counsel of record, Thomas L. Kay of Snell & 
Wilmer. Plaintiff appeared by and through her counsel of 
A-£ 
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record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon 
Forgette. 
The court, having reviewed the respective motions, 
supporting and opposing memoranda, having heard oral argument, 
and being fully apprised in this matter, 
HEREBY ORDERS that the Motions for Summary Judgment are 
hereby denied. 
DATED this Iffi^day of~Mefrc*r> 1992, 
BY'THE COURT: 
JV DENNIS FREDERICK 
CT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
STRAWS* ST HANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Attorneys for Defendant Sharp 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendant Healy 
JJ hipweti\order3 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Regular May Term, 1992 June 23, 1992 
Shelly Hipwell, an individual 
by and through her guardians, 
Sherrie Jensen and Shayne 
Hipwell, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. No. 920218 
Roger Sharp, Tim W. Healy, 910905017CV 
and Does I through X, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having 
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal 
be, and the same is, granted as prayed. 
A-R 
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Senate Debate on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
January 18, 1965 
Senator Welch (introducing the bill): 
Now, I'd like to, I'd like to very briefly, uh, explain to you 
the experience that has occurred in our neighboring states. And 
this is one of the reasons why, in my opinion, it is very important 
that we act upon this bill. 
About a year, about two years ago now, the Supreme Court of 
the State of California, by a court order in response to a, a case, 
a specific case brought before that court, just by a court rule and 
court order abolished — completely abolished — governmental 
immunity in that state, within overnight practically, that state 
was besieged with millions of dollars worth of suits and claims 
against the State of California and its entities. This matter was 
of such great importance to the people of the State of California 
that a, that a special session of the legislature of the State of 
California was called. And that special session passed a 
moratorium on suits against the government of the State of 
California or its entities. And this moratorium was for a year's 
time, until such time as they could make a study and come back with 
recommendations to the legislature. 
They did come back and they did make recommendations and they 
did pass a bill. They passed a series of bills, a very complex 
series of bills. We have, we have had the benefit of those bills. 
We have studied them. That those bills in that state, uh, that 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
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legislature, set out immunity by statute in the State of California 
and as we go along you'll find out that's exactly what we've done. 
They set up immunity by statute and then out of the immunity the 
State of California, through its legislative process, carved out 
certain areas in which an action might be brought by the citizens 
of that state against the government of the State of California or 
its entities or subdivisions. This is a matter of controlling, to 
a certain extent, rather than leaving the thing wide open. 
I would like to also emphasize that about a year ago in the 
State of Arizona the Supreme Court did exactly the same thing. And 
I could read you that decision if you like, I have it here, but I'm 
not going to bore you with it. But the supreme court in essence 
said this: The rule of governmental immunity is a rule that has 
been set up and adopted by the courts. It is not a statutory 
creature and therefore it can be abolished by the courts and we 
therefore abolish statutory or I mean governmental immunity from 
suit in our state. 
I was on a panel with the assistant director of uh, the 
legislative council of the State of Arizona. This was about two 
months ago over in the State of Wyoming at the Western Conference 
of the Council of State Governments. I was uh, chairman of the 
panel in connection with governmental immunity and I have there, on 
the panel with me, this man from Arizona. We also had a professor 
from the State of California whose is largely responsible for the, 
for the research and work that went into the California act. This 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
1 1 8 2 - 3 6 1 2 
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man from Arizona said immediately upon the, upon the, uh, abolition 
or striking out and, uh, overruling of governmental immunity in 
their state by this court order, that they were beset by Six 
Million Dollars worth of suits. And they are very anxiously 
working and planning to solve the problem such as the way 
California did. And I have provided them with materials which we 
have, which we have uh, been able to develop in this state. 
Now, this isn't all. About six months ago the court of the 
State of Nevada did exactly the same thing. Now I want to merely 
point out to you, what I!m trying to point out to you and trying to 
get over to you is the fact that a court order or a court decision 
which completely waives and does away with the doctrine of 
governmental immunity then throws the doors wide open to all and 
every kind of suit that might be brought. And I'd like to, to 
state that, that our approach to this matter has been to take a 
middle of the road course. To open the door for those people where 
there's obvious uh, serious handicap to the individual who has been 
injured, but not to leave it open, that door wide open so that it 
will be detrimental to the interest of the state and its 
subdivisions. 
Tape No. 2, Lines 8.3 to 14.5. 
* * * 
Now I'd like to, after going through that general, general 
discussion, I'd like to just, just briefly run through some of the 
provisions of this bill and I'll appreciate it if you'll turn to 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
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the bill. It's Senate Bill 4, Senate Bill 4 in your file there. 
Now if you'll note the first part of this bill just has to do with 
definitions and I don't think we'll need to spend any time on that. 
Section 2, if you'll read it, reaffirms for this state the doctrine 
of governmental immunity. It does it by statute. We do not have 
governmental immunity by statute in the State of Utah. We have 
governmental immunity only by reason of having the court having 
said so. And therefore the court could waive it if it wanted to. 
So we reaffirm in this statute, in this bill, the doctrine of 
governmental immunity, Section 2. I'm, I'muh, I think I'm wrong. 
Section 3. Section 3. It says "Except as may be otherwise 
provided in this act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from the activity of said 
entity wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge 
of a governmental function." Now, we reaffirm that and then later 
on we carve out of that immunity various areas. 
Tape 2, Line 24 to 26. 
* * * 
I have uh, uh, about gone through this bill uh, gentlemen. I 
want to assure you that, that in my opinion this is a necessary 
bill. I think that it will not hurt the State of Utah or its 
subdivisions. I think that it will be helpful because I think that 
uh, we have just as much a possibility of the court, the courts 
taking this matter into their hands and determining that there is, 
that there should be a doing away with this doctrine. I'm not 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
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going to foretell when and how, but it has happened in the 
surrounding states and I think that this, this approach that we 
have seen is the reasonable approach. It is not, it is not opening 
the door all the way, and Ifve said this about three times and I 
want to emphasize it, it is not opening the door all the way to 
allowing suits of every kind against the state and its entities. 
It opens it part-way. But this part-way opening does protect the 
citizens of our state. 
Tape 3, Line 20 to 22. 
0 0 0 0 4 2 3 1 
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s E N A T E : C H A M B E R 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
CERTIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE TRANSCRIPT 
I hereby certify that the attached document consisting of 0 signed 
pages is a true and authentic verbatim record of the discussion of Senate 
Bill/House Bill No, 5.B. 4 which occurred in the Senate Chamber 
duringthe^<Zg^t^^^^ Legislative Session on y/r/^S' a nd 
is recorded on Disk/Tape No. Jl <f 5 in the Senate Office. 
Date Certified 
\s*j>jtiF. ri<rf?t***L^ 
Name 
' / T ; Title 
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of $100,000 placed upon him wniie a person who is injured 
by a similar governmental employee also performing a "non-
essential" function has no limit. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 
31-32)• Respondents would dispute that the University of 
Utah Medical Center is a •'non-essentialn function of govern-
ment especially to these persons like Mrs. Condemarin whose 
very life may depend on it. In any event, this argument must 
fail for two reasons. First, under common law there was 
always discrimination between a person injured by a state 
employee functioning in a government capacity and one injured 
by a state employee functioning in a proprietary capacity. 
Under soverign immunity the person injured in the governmental 
function was absolutely barred from any recovery whereas a 
complete recovery was possible as to the proprietary function. 
Again, however, this inequality does not give rise to a 
constitutional claim since its roots were developed long before 
any constitutions were written. 
Second, while this section is inapplicable to this 
case, the new revised code Section 6 3-30-35 piaces a financial 
limit of $250,000 recovery for one person or $500,000 for two 
or more persons regardless of whether the tort feasor was acting 
in a governmental or non-governmental capacity. Under this 
new statute Appellants1 assumption that an unlimited recovery 
can be obtained for a person injured in a non-governmental 
function is simply incorrect. The distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions has totally been abandoned 
in the new Governmental Immunity Act "to escape the inevitable 
-35-
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?h<2 rule of 'the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has no application to the statutes of this ytate. 
The statutes establish the laws of this state 
respecting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
whenever there is any variance between the rules 
of equity and the rules of common law in reference 
to the same matters the rules of equity shall prevail. 
As noted by one Pennsylvania court: 
[A] person has no property, no vested right, 
in any rule of common law. . «, . [T]he law itself, 
as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, 
or even the whim, of the Legislature, unless prevented 
by constitutional limitations. The great office of 
statutes i^ to remedy defects in the common law as 
they are developed and to adapt it to changes of time 
and circumstances. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.. 113 
(1877). Kobson v. Penn Hills Softool District, 437 
A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) . 
The original scheme of liability for government entities 
and employees evolved on a case by case basis. Since government 
entities were immune from suit for government activities the 
important distinction as to the liability of the entity itself 
was whether the function was proprietary or governmental. 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
On the other hand, as to a governmental employee the question 
was whether that employee was acting in a discretionary or 
ministerial capacity. As noted by this Court: 
A governmental agent performing a discretionary 
function is immune from suit for injury arising there-
from, whereas an employee acting in a ministerial 
capacity, even though his acts may involve some 
decision makinc, is not so protected. Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). 
It would serve no useful purpose to list the numerous 
cases decided by this Court involving government employees. 
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